## 1NC — RD 4

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#### Interpretation: Topical affirmatives must instrumentally defend n expansion of the scope of the United States core antitrust laws to substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices.

#### Resolved means a policy

Louisiana House 5

(<http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>)

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### Federal government is the legislative, executive and judicial

US Legal No Date (United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/)

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### Should requires action

AHD 2k

(American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com))

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#### ‘Its’ means cooperation must be governmental

US District Court 7 (United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. John, “AGF Marine Aviation & Transp. v. Cassin,” *2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90808*, Lexis)

The Court inadvertently used the word "his" when the Court intended to use the word "its." The possessive pronoun was intended to refer to the party preceding its use--AGF. Indeed, that reference is consistent with the undisputed facts in this case, which indicate that Cassin completed an application for the insurance policy and submitted it to his agent, Theodore Tunick & Company ("Tunick"). Tunick, in turn, submitted the application to AGF's underwriting agent, TL Dallas. (See Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 5.)

#### The “core” antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and FTC Act

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### They violate each of the above words’ requirements of government action.

#### A predictable limit is the only way to give the neg a chance to win---radical aff choice shifts the grounds for the debate and puts the aff far ahead. Pre-tournament negative preparation is structured around topical plans as points of offense, which means anything other than a topical plan structurally favors the affirmative.

#### First, fairness---debate requires effective competition between the aff and the neg---the only way for any benefit to be produced from debate is if the judge can make a decision between two sides who have had a relatively equal chance to prepare for a common point of debate.

#### Second, contestation---debate is unique because of the iteration of limited arguments over the course of a season that forces debaters to improve their arguments and reconsider their positions. Every debater is here for different reasons, but all those reasons rely the pedagogical uniqueness of the space and maximizing its benefits. Their topic is unilaterally declared and imprecise, which prevents iteration through shallow debates, unpredictable advocacies, and lack of testing.

#### Policy debates over antitrust are valuable

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IV. Antitrust in Civil Society Competition issues are also part of the general civic discourse separate from the campaign rhetoric and legislative proposals offered by politicians. This is also a significant sign that antitrust has begun to be an important source of small “p” politics that engages substantial segments of the public at large. One example is the increased number of non-technical books intended for a lay audience that deal with the role of antitrust in a healthy economy and democracy. Recent and forthcoming books dealing with these themes include Tim Wu’s “The Curse of Bigness,”109 Matt Stoller’s “Goliath,”110 Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi’s “Competition Overdose,”111 Zephyr Teachout’s “Break ‘em Up,”112 and David Dayan’s “Monopolized.”113 On the academic side, there are a plethora of government and NGO studies of competition policy on digital competition114 and new works are flourishing which explore the broader ramifications of antitrust and competition in society.115 Long form and more mass-market journalism have also taken up the mantle of exploring the role of antitrust and competition policy. Such diverse magazines as The Atlantic,116 Time, 117 New Republic,118 American Prospect,119 Rolling Stone,120 New York Times magazine,121 Variety,122 National Review, 123 Foreign Policy,124 and other policy and opinion magazines have all run recent stories or profiles of individuals involved in antitrust issues. Before the COVID-19 pandemic effectively monopolized press coverage in the United States, there were thirty-three antitrust related stories on the front page of the New York Times or the front page of its business section over a three-month period in late 2019. 125 A majority of the stories focused on tech giants such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook.126 In addition, the New York Times also covered stories about mergers, merger policy, local issues such as the Chicago taxi market, and various smaller industries.127 This is separate from coverage during the same period of campaign issues and candidate statements relating to the field. A similar increase in coverage during this same period can be observed anecdotally in more business-oriented publications like Forbes, Barron’s, Wired, and the Wall Street Journal; general newspapers like USA Today, Washington Post, and Huffington Post; more local newspapers; as well as radio and television.128 Web pages and social media accounts on these issues have similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives.129 Lobbying and public policy groups are growing in number and influence. Beyond the traditional trade associations and general think tanks there are now a number of active groups with antitrust as a large part of their focus. These include the Open Markets Institute, 130 American Antitrust Institute, 131 Anti-Monopoly Fund,132 Institute for Self-Reliance,133 Public Citizen,134 Public Knowledge,135 Demos, 136 and the International Center for Law and Economics.137 At the more technical legal end of the debate, antitrust is similarly flourishing as a field. One sees increased law school hiring in the field for the first time in decades. Academic institutes and centers abound with a wide variety of perspectives ranging from libertarian to enforcement oriented.138 Most major antitrust cases now feature multiple amicus briefs from legal and economic experts on both sides of an issue both in the Supreme Court or the Courts of Appeals.139 Conclusion Antitrust has always been political in nature. Antitrust law provides broad legal commands dealing with how governments and private individuals can challenge different types of market behavior. In this way, antitrust has not changed. Antitrust will never take the place of sports, the Dow Jones index, or the weather for conversation at the breakfast table, but it has become a meaningful part of the political and policy debate for candidates, the legislature, and important segments of civil society. What has changed, however, is the degree that antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once mostly the domain of technocrats, antitrust issues have been proposed and debated by Presidential candidates, political parties, legislators, pundits, journalists, lobby groups, and voters alike. There are also a flurry of serious proposals and investigations that would make significant changes to the current system if adopted. This is all to the good. Even if none of the current proposals come to fruition, the antitrust debate is part of a broader engagement with political economy issues dealing with fundamental concerns such as economic concentration, globalization, income inequality, social and racial justice, and even recently the proper response to the COVID-19 emergency. The many proposals, initiatives, and pressure groups represent at a minimum the return of antitrust as part of the progressive agenda.

#### They can’t get offense---we don’t have the power to impose a norm, only to persuade you that their arguments should be rejected---every debate requires a winner and loser, so voting negative doesn’t reject them from debate, it just says they should make a better argument next time

Amanda Anderson 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290

MY RECENT BOOK, The Way We Argue Now, has in a sense two theses. In the first place, the book makes the case for the importance of debate and argument to any vital democratic or pluralistic intellectual culture. This is in many ways an unexceptional position, but the premise of the book is that the claims of reasoned argument are often trumped, within the current intellectual terrain, by appeals to cultural identity and what I gather more broadly under the rubric of ethos, which includes cultural identity but also forms of ethical piety and charismatic authority. In promoting argument as a universal practice keyed to a human capacity for communicative reason, my book is a critique of relativism and identity politics, or the notion that forms of cultural authenticity or group identity have a certain unquestioned legitimacy, one that cannot or should not be subjected to the challenges of reason or principle, precisely because reason and what is often called "false universalism" are, according to this pattern of thinking, always involved in forms of exclusion, power, or domination. My book insists, by contrast, that argument is a form of respect, that the ideals of democracy, whether conceived from a nationalist or an internationalist perspective, rely fundamentally upon procedures of argumentation and debate in order to legitimate themselves and to keep their central institutions vital. And the idea that one should be protected from debate, that argument is somehow injurious to persons if it does not honor their desire to have their basic beliefs and claims and solidarities accepted without challenge, is strenuously opposed. As is the notion that any attempt to ask people to agree upon processes of reason-giving argument is somehow necessarily to impose a coercive norm, one that will disable the free expression and performance of identities, feelings, or solidarities. Disagreement is, by the terms of my book, a form of respect, not a form of disrespect. And by disagreement, I don't mean simply to say that we should expect disagreement rather than agreement, which is a frequently voiced-if misconceived-criticism of Habermas. Of course we should expect disagreement. My point is that we should focus on the moment of dissatisfaction in the face of disagreement-the internal dynamic in argument that imagines argument might be the beginning of a process of persuasion and exchange that could end in agreement (or partial agreement). For those who advocate reconciling ourselves to disagreements rather than arguing them out, by contrast, there is a complacent-and in some versions, even celebratory-attitude toward fixed disagreement. Refusing these options, I make the case for dissatisfied disagreement in the final chapter of the book and argue that people should be willing to justify their positions in dialogue with one another, especially if they hope to live together in a post-traditional pluralist society. One example of the trumping of argument by ethos is the form that was taken by the late stage of the Foucault/Habermas debate, where an appeal to ethos-specifically, an appeal to Foucault's style of ironic or negative critique, often seen as most in evidence in the interviews, where he would playfully refuse labels or evade direct answers-was used to exemplify an alternative to the forms of argument employed by Habermas and like-minded critics. (I should pause to say that I provide this example, and the framing summary of the book that surrounds it, not to take up airtime through expansive self-reference, but because neither of my respondents provided any contextualizing summary of the book's central arguments, though one certainly gets an incremental sense of the book's claims from Bruce Robbins. Because I don't assume that readers of this forum have necessarily read the book, and because I believe that it is the obligation of forum participants to provide sufficient context for their remarks, I will perform this task as economically as I can, with the recognition that it might have carried more weight if provided by a respondent rather than the author.) The Foucauldian counter-critique importantly emphasizes a relation between style and position, but it obscures (1) the importance or value of the Habermasian critique and (2) the possibility that the other side of the debate might have its own ethos to advocate, one that has precisely to do with an ethos of argument, an ideal of reciprocal debate that involves taking distance on one's pre-given forms of identity or the norms of one's community, both so as to talk across differences and to articulate one's claims in relation to shared and even universal ideals. And this leads to the second thesis of the book, the insistence that an emphasis on ethos and character is interestingly present if not widely recognized in contemporary theory, and one of the ways its vitality and existential pertinence makes itself felt (even despite the occurrence of the kinds of unfair trumping moves I have mentioned). We often fail to notice this, because identity has so uniformly come to mean sociological, ascribed, or group identity-race, gender, class, nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, and so forth. Instances of the move toward character and ethos include the later Foucault (for whom ethos is a central concept), cosmopolitanism (whose aspiration it is to turn universalism into an ethos), and, more controversially, proceduralist ethics and politics (with its emphasis on sincerity and civility). Another version of this attentiveness to ethos and character appears in contemporary pragmatism, with its insistence on casualness of attitude, or insouciance in the face of contingency-recommendations that get elevated into full-fledged exemplary personae in Richard Rorty's notion of the "ironist" or Barbara Herrnstein Smiths portrait of the "postmodern skeptic." These examples-and the larger claim they support-are meant to defend theory as still living, despite the many reports of its demise, and in fact still interestingly and incessantly re-elaborating its relation to practice. This second aspect of the project is at once descriptive, motivated by the notion that characterology within theory is intrinsically interesting, and critical, in its attempt to identify how characterology can itself be used to cover or evade the claims of rational argument, as in appeals to charismatic authority or in what I identify as narrow personifications of theory (pragmatism, in its insistence on insouciance in the face of contingency, is a prime example of this second form). And as a complement to the critical agenda, there is a reconstructive agenda as well, an attempt to recuperate liberalism and proceduralism, in part by advocating the possibility, as I have suggested, of an ethos of argument. Robbins, in his extraordinarily rich and challenging response, zeroes in immediately on a crucial issue: who is to say exactly when argument is occurring or not, and what do we do when there is disagreement over the fundamentals (the primary one being over what counts as proper reasoning)? Interestingly, Robbins approaches this issue after first observing a certain tension in the book: on the one hand, The Way We Argue Now calls for dialogue, debate, argument; on the other, its project is "potentially something a bit stricter, or pushier: getting us all to agree on what should and should not count as true argument." What this point of entry into the larger issue reveals is a kind of blur that the book, I am now aware, invites. On the one hand, the book anatomizes academic debates, and in doing so is quite "debaterly" This can give the impression that what I mean by argument is a very specific form unique to disciplinary methodologies in higher education. But the book is not generally advocating a narrow practice of formal and philosophical argumentation in the culture at large, however much its author may relish adherence to the principle of non-contradiction in scholarly argument. I take pains to elaborate an ethos of argument that is linked to democratic debate and the forms of dissent that constitutional patriotism allows and even promotes. In this sense, while argument here is necessarily contextualized sociohistorically, the concept is not merely academic. It is a practice seen as integral to specific political forms and institutions in modern democracies, and to the more general activity of critique within modern societies-to the tradition of the public sphere, to speak in broad terms. Additionally, insofar as argument impels one to take distance on embedded customs, norms, and senses of given identity, it is a practice that at once acknowledges identity, the need to understand the perspectives of others, and the shared commitment to commonality and generality, to finding a way to live together under conditions of difference. More than this: the book also discusses at great length and from several different angles the issue that Robbins inexplicably claims I entirely ignore: the question of disagreement about what counts as argument. In the opening essay, "Debatable Performances," I fault the proponents of communicative ethics for not having a broader understanding of public expression, one that would include the disruptions of spectacle and performance. I return to and underscore this point in my final chapter, where I espouse a democratic politics that can embrace and accommodate a wide variety of expressions and modes. This is certainly a discussion of what counts as dialogue and hence argument in the broad sense in which I mean it, and in fact I fully acknowledge that taking distance from cultural norms and given identities can be advanced not only through critical reflection, but through ironic critique and defamiliarizing performance as well. But I do insist-and this is where I take a position on the fundamental disagreements that have arisen with respect to communicative ethics-that when they have an effect, these other dimensions of experience do not remain unreflective, and insofar as they do become reflective, they are contributing to the very form of reasoned analysis that their champions sometimes imagine they must refuse in order to liberate other modes of being (the affective, the narrative, the performative, the nonrational). If a narrative of human rights violation is persuasive in court, or in the broader cultural public sphere, it is because it draws attention to a violation of humanity that is condemned on principle; if a performance jolts people out of their normative understandings of sexuality and gender, it prompts forms of understanding that can be affirmed and communicated and also can be used to justify political positions and legislative agendas.

### 1NC — CP

#### We advocate that the United States federal government adopt the Green New Deal.

#### Green New Deal framework unites policy vision, moral framework, and power analysis to address climate change, racial injustice, and economic deprivation. The racist legacy of environmental injustice proves the need to craft a new vision rather than give in to inevitability of failure

Rhiana **GUNN-WRIGHT** Climate Policy Director @ Roosevelt Inst. ‘**20** in *Winning the Green New Deal* eds. Prakash & Guido Girgenti p. ecopy not paginated

People often ask me why I decided to help develop the Green New Deal. Why did I, a twentysomething black woman, think I could help develop a policy proposal to address something as big as climate change? Often, I think they expect some grand story: about incredible courage or deep ambition or a master plan for the revolution. The truth is that I was scared—and I really needed a job.t

I grew up, raised by my mother and grandmother, in the same house that my mother grew up in, in a neighborhood on the South Side of Chicago called Englewood. In the thirty years between my grandparents moving in with their three babies and me being born, Englewood had gone from being a (mostly) middle-income community, close-knit and quiet, to one of the poorest, most barren parts of the city. My neighborhood had so many problems: poverty, unemployment, underfunded schools, police brutality, pollution, violence. And those were just the big ones. I rarely saw anyone in power try to solve the problems in Englewood. And when they did try, it seemed to make things worse.

When I asked my mom and grandma why Englewood looked like this, they didn’t tell me about guns or drugs or gangs. They told me about the government. About how the highway system had been built through black neighborhoods, destroying communities that would never be rebuilt. About the public housing authority razing public housing and scattering families in the name of “urban development,” only for city officials to turn around and sell the land to developers on the cheap, now that the projects sat on prime real estate. About the city underfunding black schools and then shutting them down because of “underperformance.” And that’s just what happened to my neighborhood—not even what happened to my family. At the time I’m writing this, I now know that:

My grandmother’s family was not eligible for Social Security for at least fifteen years because her mother was a washerwoman, and the New Deal excluded agricultural and domestic workers (nearly all black at the time) from Social Security—President Roosevelt needed to secure votes from Southern Democrats and Southern Democrats needed cheap labor from economically vulnerable black people.

My grandfather bought our house without any help from the GI Bill, despite being a veteran of the Korean War. My mother told me that he was too proud to apply. The truth is, pride or not, the government denied home loans to black veterans, and the notorious redlining in Chicago meant that he wouldn’t have been approved anyway.

I grew up in a frontline community—meaning that I lived in an area close to a pollution source and with high levels of air pollution. I developed asthma, like most of my friends in my neighborhood. I could barely run until I was in my late teens, and I regularly missed school, which, in turn, meant that my self-employed mother had to miss work. My mother and I had no idea that I was sick because of where we lived. My lungs are weakened to this day.

Progress came with a price, and the price was us. And by the time the Green New Deal came into my life, I would be damned before I paid another dime.

WHAT IS POLICY?

I have spent my life trying to rewrite systems of power, and policy is nothing if not a system for creating and distributing power**.** This is, of course, not how most people think of public policy. In fact, most “official” definitions of policy say something like this:

Policy [is] a statement by government—at whatever level, in whatever form—of what it intends to do about a public problem. Such statements can be found in the Constitution, statutes, regulation, case law (that is, court decisions), agency or leadership decisions, or even in changes of the behavior of government officials at all levels. For example, a law that says that those caught driving while intoxicated will go to jail for up to one year is a statement of governmental policy to punish drunk drivers. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is a statement of government policy toward the environment….

And: “Policy is what the government chooses to do or not to do” about a public problem.

This is all true. But definitions like this make policy design sound like it’s orderly and contained—much like going to the doctor. You have a problem; the doctor diagnoses it; you two find the best treatment. Creating policy is more like going to the doctor with a problem, having fifteen people argue about if it’s a “real” problem that requires a doctor to begin with, then having five of those people (plus some new strangers!) start arguing anew about what the cause of the problem is, only to be interrupted by the doctor’s boss coming in to tell them that they can only choose two of five possible treatment options because the other three would hurt the hospital’s bottom line. And once treatment begins, people argue over how to determine whether it’s successful and if it should be reversed to save money or time.

Policymaking is not a science. It is a fight over whose problems get addressed, how those problems are addressed, and how public power and resources are distributed. If politics is a fight to elect people who reflect and share our values, policy is a fight to actually enact those values—to mold the world, through the work of government, into what we think it should be.

That is why, contrary to popular belief, the most important part of a policy proposal is not the details—at least at the beginning. It’s the vision that the policy presents. As a statement about what the government is going to do, policy inherently tells a story about what went wrong, how the government can fix it, and who has power to shape society—whether it’s the state or the public or corporations. The best policies tell compelling stories, galvanizing legislators and citizens to fight for them, and provide public servants with a clear purpose when they sit down to implement the details. The stories may shift as opponents pick new battles; the details may need tweaks or overhauls as unexpected challenges emerge. A coherent policy vision provides the foundation that both the stories and the details draw upon. Three pillars—the problem, principles, and power—form that foundation, and anchor policymaking from conception to execution.

Problems are the center of any public policy. Because policy is the government’s response to a problem, policy can only be created if we agree that an issue constitutes not just a problem but a public problem—that is, a problem that affects the public that cannot be solved without the government. How we define the scope and origin of the problem determines how we’ll craft a solution. That’s why fossil fuel companies spend millions to sow doubts about the urgency of the climate crisis and cover up their culpability. It’s not just about saving face; it’s about changing our understanding of the problem and preventing government action.

Principles. Policymakers need a compass to navigate the near-infinite variety of policy designs, and principles— which include both our moral values and our theories of government—provide that compass. Remember, policymaking is collective problem-solving—not an objective “science.” Policymaking, like all decision-making, is guided not only by facts but by our values—about freedom and justice, about what we deserve, about what “other people” deserve and, perhaps most crucially, about what the government should and should not do. Principles are, in short, the moral and intellectual core of a policy. They define not only how we engage with a problem but what solutions we consider at all.

Problems in our society are rooted in power. Asking why a problem remains unresolved leads to questions of power: Who wields it and to what end? Are the powerful negligent or malevolent? By directing and entrenching flows of government resources and attention, policy always shapes the distribution of power. Effective, lasting policy changes must change the distributions of power that led to the problem initially, or else the old malefactors will undermine any success. When selecting the mechanisms a policy will use (a loan; a new legal protection; a direct public investment; a new federal agency), policymakers are deciding how to maintain or disrupt the balance of power. And this is not limited to power in the public sector. Governments write the laws, enforce the contracts, and build the infrastructure that make a society and economy possible. Policy changes reverberate beyond the public sector into every domain of our lives.

Problems, principles, and power are the pillars of any policy vision. Together, they animate the policymaking process, guiding not just the story policymakers tell but the decisions they make about what should (or should not) be included in a given proposal.

IS THE GREEN NEW DEAL A POLICY?

The Green New Deal is a proposal for a ten-year economic mobilization to rapidly transition the US to a zero-carbon economy and, in so doing so, regenerate and reorganize the US economy in ways that significantly reduce inequality and redress legacies of systemic oppression. The congressional Green New Deal (“GND”) resolution has five goals:

1. Achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions through a fair and just transition for all communities and workers.

2. Create millions of good, high-wage jobs and ensure prosperity and economic security for all people of the United States.

3. Invest in the infrastructure and industry of the United States to sustainably meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

4. Secure clean air and water, climate and community resilience, healthy food, access to nature, and a sustainable environment for all.

5. Promote justice and equity by stopping current, preventing future, and repairing historic oppression of frontline and vulnerable communities, including Indigenous peoples, communities of color, migrant communities, deindustrialized communities, depopulated rural communities, the poor, lowincome workers, women, the elderly, the unhoused, people with disabilities, and youth.

The GND resolution proposes to achieve these goals in two ways. The first is through a set of “projects” that, if completed, would nearly eliminate carbon emissions in the US. The second is through a set of policies that aim to protect Americans from the disruption and instability that transitioning away from fossil fuels will create and reduce inequity. Some people like to refer to the first set of projects as the “Green” part of the GND and the second as the “New Deal” part. While this may be a helpful rhetorical device, it is a dangerous way to conceptualize the GND. All parts of the GND advance decarbonization—even the “non-climate” policies like universal health care, education, and job training. Similarly, the “green” projects can help reduce inequity if they are designed to create millions of wellpaying jobs, bolster worker power, invest in local communities, and strengthen the social safety net—all of which the Green New Deal proposes to do. Addressing decarbonization and inequality simultaneously has prompted critics to accuse the GND of being a “progressive wish list,” not a policy. Their criticism often reveals a narrow policy vision guiding their thinking. The problem is simply the carbon in the atmosphere; Mr. Policy Doctor will prescribe the correct solution based on science; imbalances of power are mostly irrelevant, too difficult to disrupt when an urgent crisis needs solving. This is a compelling story. But it cannot guide policymakers tasked with averting catastrophic warming, as many authors in this book show.

The Green New Deal is a new policy vision—one that will guide government and society through the biggest task in modern history: decarbonizing our global economy within the next ten to twenty years. The stories and details of GND policy will undoubtedly change in the coming years, but they will be anchored by the vision—a conception of the problem, a set of principles, and an analysis of power—that the GND provides. Vision, however, is not enough. The GND also establishes a framework for a national economic mobilization and a set of ever-evolving and specific policies that fit within this vision and framework.

#### Only the state can transform society/behavior in time to avoid worst impacts of climate change

Beardsworth, PhD, 20

(Richard, Politics@Leeds, Climate science, the politics of climate change and futures of IR, *International Relations*, https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117820946365)

Climate action requires political action simply because, without political action, the scale of the challenge as well as the time within which this action must be achieved cannot be met. If the shutting down of the global economy during the first 4 months of COVID-19 led to an 8 percent annual decrease in carbon emissions, and this decrease is required yearly for the next 10 years, nothing short of coordinated national and international action can be effective. As the logic behind the CoP15 Paris Agreement understood, in a world structured by a system of states, the state remains, in relation with other states, the effective focus for these national and international acts of coordination. One can maintain, of course, that concerted reflection on goals and their practice cannot be rehearsed within the same state system that, in co-evolution with capitalism, has produced the climate problem in the first place.24 Yet, my argument here is simple: (1) climate action must be of a political kind if this action is to be coherent and effective, and the horizon of this understanding of the political (comprehensive and effective action) is in a vital sense defined by the state; (2) this political action redounds above all to the agency and responsibility of the state both in relation to its own citizenry and in relation to other states and their citizenry. In response to the challenge of time and scale, I argue we should turn to, not turn away from, the state as an agent of change. Only if one renounces the potential of political action today through historically constituted practices of political efficacy does one shun this kind of conclusion. In which case, I would argue, one has renounced politics for our age, as well as the major emotion on which politics is based, hope.25 Since Max Weber, the state is sociologically defined by the legitimate monopoly of violence that it holds over all other forms of force within a nationally determined territory.26 There are many ways in which this monopoly is contested today. The description of a state as ‘vulnerable’ is nothing but the indication that a particular state does not hold the monopoly of violence within its territory. Prior to questions of political authority and legitimacy, all states are today vulnerable in this sense given the nature of global challenges that follow intended and unintended processes of interdependence (global financial instability, global terrorism, migration flows, pandemics, climate change, etc.). That said, the responses both to the financial crisis of 2008 and (much more so) to the present COVID-19 crisis testify to the fact that the monopoly of violence particular to the effectiveness of state governance remains in place. Among an increasing complexity of social actors, the state still holds the levers of power that are decisive in effecting social transformation. Consequently, to one side of the empirical fact that countries constitute the beef of the UNFCCC climate regime, I am arguing that the state remains the primary vehicle of a politics of climate change. As the emerging literature on the Green New Deal implies, the state can do the following. At a national level, it can organize and steer fiscal, monetary and sector-policies like those of energy, transport, agriculture, the communications industry and housing in such a way that both businesses and consumers are motivated to shift behaviour towards a carbon-neutral society. This model of the state is one of a regulated market economy that uses the coordination of state direction with market dynamism to effect broad social change. Governments respond to markets as they plan ahead with regard to climate change (the rapid fall in the price of solar and wind energy, for example), and much of the new green infrastructure is/will be locally distributed and assembled (no ‘giant public works’ given that contemporary technology is smart).27 That said, governments are the sole governance body with appropriate fiscal and monetary tools (1) to set up the rebuilding of national economies with new strategic priorities; (2) to steer and to guarantee concerted action across sectors; and (3) to guarantee, in turn, that this action is underpinned by the principles of ‘a just transition’.28 If the timeline to a 50 percent reduction of carbon emissions is 2030, then the state must so organize and steer that solutions to climate change are integrated. Attention to ‘the climate emergency’ alone will not lead to the necessary change. This last point is important and suggests why the idea of the Green New Deal, whether one is on the Left or Right, harbours the appropriate response. The integration of climate policy with radical policies for poverty alleviation and re-employment in sustainable industries and commerce provides the only way in which the shift from an extractive to a regenerative economy and society is possible in the first place. Without this convergence of solutions, practical solutions to climate change will not only tackle the scale and timeline of the problem; they will re-create a deeply divided polity of the employed and unemployed that could lead to ever-worse scenarios of a politics based on division and fear, not community and hope. It is the state alone – in conjunction with the forces of the market and civil society – that can provide the vision, the terms of execution of this vision (organized integration) and, critically, the policy-leverage that can bring about economic and social convergence.

#### Liberalism is the best ethical platform for emancipatory change, and racial oppression is a product of contingent inequalities in distribution of power rather than an inevitable consequence of enlightenment thought—it is the most ethical research method in debate

Mills 17 (Charles, a Caribbean philosopher from Jamaica. He is known for his work in social and political philosophy, particularly in oppositional political theory as centred on class, gender, and race. “Occupy Liberalism!”, Black Rights/White Wrongs, Kindle)

The “Occupy!” movement, which has made headlines around the country, has raised the hopes of young American radicals new to political engagement and revived the hopes of an older generation of radicals still clinging to nostalgic dreams of the glorious ’603. If the original and still most salient target was Wall Street, a long list of other candidates for “occupation” has since been put forward. In this essay, I want to propose as a target for radical occupation the somewhat unusual candidate of liberalism itself. But contrary to the conventional wisdom prevailing within radical circles, I am going to argue for the heretical thesis that liberalism should not be contemptuously rejected by radicals but retrieved for a radical agenda. Summarized in bullet-point form, my argument is as follows: 0 The “Occupy Wall Street" movement provides an opportunity unprecedented in decades to build a broad democratic movement to challenge plutocracy, patriarchy, and white supremacy in the United States. 0 Such a movement is more likely to be successful if it appeals to principles and values most Americans already endorse. o Liberalism has always been the dominant ideology in the United States. - Liberalism in the United States has historically been complicit with plutocracy, patriarchy, and white supremacy, but this complicity is a contingent function of dominant group interests rather than the result of an immanent conceptual logic. Therefore progressives in philosophy [and elsewhere) should try to retrieve liberalism for a radical democratic agenda rather than rejecting it, thereby positioning themselves in the ideological mainstream of the country and seeking its transformation. Let me now try to make this argument plausible for an audience likely to be aprioristically convinced of its obvious unsoundness. Preliminary Clarification of Terms First we need to clarify the key terms of “radicalism” and “liberalism.” While of course a radicalism of the right exists, I mean to refer here to radicals who are progressives. But “progressive” cannot just denote the left of the political spectrum, since the whole point of the “new social movements” of the 19 605 onwards was that the traditional left-right political spectrum, predicated on varying positions on the question of public vs. private ownership, did not ex- haust the topography of the political. Issues of gender and racial domination were to a significant extent “orthogonal” to this one-dimensional trope. So I will use “radicalism” broadly, though still in the zone of progressive politics, to refer generally to ideas/ concepts / principles/values endorsing pro-egalitari- an structural change to reduce or eliminate unjust hierarchies of domination. “Liberalism” may denote both a political philosophy and the institutions and practices characteristically tied to that political philosophy. My focus will be on the former. The issue of how bureaucratic logics may prove refractory to reformist agendas is undeniably an important one, but it does not really fall into the purview of philosophy proper. My aim is to challenge the radical Shibboleth that radical ideas / concepts/ principles/values are incompatible with liberalism. Given the deep entrenchment of this assumption in the worldview of most radicals, refuting it would still be an accomplishment, even if working out practical details of operationalization are delegated to other hands. In the United States, of course, “liberalism” in public parlance and everyday political discourse is used in such a way that it really denotes left- liberalism specifically (“left” by the standards of a country whose center of gravity has shifted right in recent decades]. In this vocabulary, right-liberals are then categorized as “conservatives”—in the market sense, as against the Burkean sense. On the other hand, some on the right would insist that only they, the heirs to the classic liberalism of John Locke and Adam Smith, are re- ally entitled to the “liberal” designation. Later welfarist theorists are fraudu- lent pretenders to be exposed as socialist intruders unworthy of the title. Re- jecting both of these usages, I will be employing “liberalism” in the expanded sense typical of political philosophy, which links both ends of this spectrum. “Liberalism” then refers broadly to the anti-feudal ideology of individual- ism, equal rights, and moral egalitarianism that arises in Western Europe in the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries to challenge the ideas and values inherited from the old medieval order, and which is subsequently taken up and develped by others elsewhere, including many who would have been explicitly excluded by the original conception of the ideology. Left-wing so- cial democrats and right—wing market conservatives, fans of John Rawls on the one hand and Robert Nozick on the other, are thus both liberals.1 From this perspective, it will be appreciated that liberalism is not a monolith but an umbrella term for a variety of positions. Here are some ex- amples—some familiar, some perhaps less so: Varieties of Liberalism Left-wing [social democratic) vs. Right-wing (market conservative) Kantian vs. Lockean Contractarian vs. Utilitarian Corporate vs. Democratic Social vs. Individualist Comprehensive vs. Political Ideal-theory vs. Non-ideal-theory Patriarchal vs. Feminist Imperial vs. Anti-imperial Racial vs. Anti-racial Color-blind vs. Color-conscious Etc. It is not the case, of course, that these different species of liberalism have been equally represented in the ideational sphere, or equally implemented in the institutional sphere. On the contrary, some have been dominant while others have been subordinate, and some have never, at least in the full sense, been implemented at all. But nonetheless, I suggest they all count as liberalisms and as such they are all supposed to have certain elements in common, even those characterized by gender and racial exclusions. (My motivation for making these last varieties of liberalism rather than deviations from liberalism is precisely to challenge liberalism’s self- congratulatory history, which holds an idealized Platonized liberalism aloft, untainted by its actual record of complicity with oppressive social systems.) So the initial question we should always ask people making generalizations about “liberalism” is: What particular variety of liberalism do you mean? And are your generalizations really true about all the possible kinds of liberalism, or only a subset? Here is a characterization of liberalism from a very respectable source, the British political theorist, John Gray: Common to all variants of the liberal tradition is a definite conception, distinctively modern in character, of man and society. . . . It is individualist, in that it asserts the moral primacy of the person against the claims of any social collectivity; egalitarian, inasmuch as it confers on all men the same moral status and denies the relevance to legal or political order of differences in moral worth among human beings; universalist, affirming the moral unity of the human species and according a secondary importance to specific historic associations and cultural forms; and meliorist in its affirmation of the corrigibility and improvability of all social institutions and political arrangements. It is this conception of man and society which gives liberalism a definite identity which transcends its vast internal variety and complexity.2 What generate the different varieties of liberalism are different concepts of individualism, different claims about how egalitarianism should be con- strued or realized, more or less inclusionary readings of universalism [Gray’s characterization sanitizes liberalism’s actual sexist and racist history), dif- ferent views of what count as desirable improvements, conﬂicting normative balancings of liberal values (freedom, equality) and competing theoretical prognoses about how best they can be realized in the light of (contested) soda-historical facts. The huge potential for disagreement about all of these explains how a common liberal core can produce such a wide range of vari- ants. Moreover, we need to take into account not merely the spectrum of actual liberalisms but also hypothetical liberalisms that could be generated through novel framings of some or all of the above. So one would need to differentiate dominant versions of liberalism from Oppositional versions, and actual from possible variants. Once the breadth of the range of liberalisms is appreciated—dominant and subordinate, actual and potential—the obvious question then raised is: Even if actual dominant liberalisms have been conservative in various ways (corporate, patriarchal, racist) why does this rule out the development of emancipatory, radical liberalisms? One kind of answer is the following [call this the internalist answer): Because there is an immanent conceptual/ normative logic to liberalism as a political ideology that precludes any emancipatory development of it. Another kind of answer is the following [call this the externalist an- swer): It doesn't. The historic domination of conservative exclusionary lib- eralisms is the result of group interests, group power, and successful group political projects. Apparent internal conceptual /normative barriers to an emancipatory liberalism can be successfully negotiated by drawing on the conceptual/normative resources of liberalism itself, in conjunction with a revisionist socio-historical picture of modernity. Most self-described radicals would endorse—indeed, reﬂexively, as an obvious truth-the first answer. But as indicated from the beginning, I think the second answer is actually the correct one. The obstacles to developing a “radical liberalism” are, in my opinion, primarily externalist in nature: material group interests, and the way they have shaped hegemonic varieties of liberalism. So I think we need to try to justify a radical agenda with the normative resources of liberalism rather than writing off liberalism. Since liberalism has always been the dominant ideology in the United States, and is now globally hegemonic, such a project would have the great ideological advantage of appealing to values and principles that most people already endorse. All projects of egalitarian social transformation are going to face a combination of material, political, and ideological obstacles, but this strategy would at least reduce somewhat the dimensions of the last. One would be trying to win mass support for policies that—and the challenge will, of course, be to demonstrate this—are justifiable by majoritarian norms, once reconceived and put in conjunction with facts not always familiar to the majority. Material barriers [vested group interests) and political barriers [organizational difficulties) will of course remain. But they will constitute a general obstacle for all egalitarian political programs, and as such cannot be claimed to be peculiar problems for an emancipatory liberalism. But the contention will be that such a liberalism cannot be developed. Why? Here are ten familiar objections, variants of internalism, and my re- plies to them. Ten Reasons Why Liberalism Cannot Be Radicalized (And My Replies) 1. Liberalism Has an Asocial, Atomic Individualist Ontology This is one of the oldest radical critiques of liberalism; it can be found in Marx’s derisive comments, for example in the Grundrisse, about the “Robin- sonades” of the social contract theory whose “golden age” [1650—1800) had long passed by the time he began his intellectual and political career: The individual and isolated hunter or fisher who forms the starting-point with Smith and Ricardo belongs to the insipid illusions of the eighteenth century. They are Robinson Crusoe stories . . . . no more based on such a naturalism than is Rousseau’s contrat social which makes naturally inde— pendent individuals come in contact and have mutual intercourse by con- tract... . . Man is in the most literal sense of the word a zoon politikon, not only a social animal, but an animal which can develop into an individual only in society. Production by individuals outside society . . . is as great an absurdity as the idea of the development of language without individuals living together and talking to one another.3 But several replies can be made to this indictment. To begin with, even if the accusation is true of contractarian liberalism, not all liberalisms are contractarian. Utilitarian liberalism rests on different theoretical founda- tions, as does the late nineteenth—century British liberalism of T. H. Green and his colleagues: a l-legelian, social liberalism.4 Closer to home, of course, we have [ohn Dewey’s brand of liberalism. MoreOver, even within the so- cial contract tradition, resources exist for contesting the assumptions of the Hobbesian/Lockean version of the contract. Rousseau's Discourse on the Origins of Inequality [1755) (nowhere given proper credit by Marxs) re- thinks the “contract” to make it a contract entered into after the formation of society, and thus the creation of socialized human beings. So the ontology presupposed is explicitly a social one. In any case, the contemporary revival of contractarianism initiated by John Rawls's 1971 A Theory of ] ustice makes the contract a thought experiment, a “device of representation," rather than a literal or even metaphorical anthropological account. The communitar- ian/contractarian debates of the 19805 onwards recapitulated much of the “asocial” critique of contractarian liberalism (though usually without a radi- cal edge). But as Rawls pointed out against Michael Sandel, for example, one needs to distinguish the figures in the thought experiment from real hu- man beings.6 And radicals should be wary about accepting a communitarian ontology and claims about the general good that deny or marginalize the dynamics of group domination in actual societies represented as “communi- ties.” The great virtue of contractarian liberal individualism is the conceptu- al room it provides for hegemonic norms to be critically evaluatedthrough the epistemic and moral distancing from Sittiichkeit that the contract, as an intellectual device, provides. 2. Liberalism Cannot Recognize Groups and Group Oppression in Its Ontology—I (Macro) The second point needs to be logically distinguished from the first, since a theory could acknowledge the social shaping of individuals while denying that group oppression is central to that shaping. [So #1 is necessary, but not sufficient, for #2.) The Marxist critique, of course, was supposed to encapsulate both points: people were shaped by society and society (post- “primitive communism") was class-dominated. The ontology was social and it was an ontology of class. Today radicals would demand a richer ontology that can accommodate the realities of gender and racial oppression also. But whatever candidates are put forward, the ‘key claim is that a liberal frame- work cannot accommodate an ontology of groups in relations of domination and subordination. To the extent that liberalism recognizes social groups, these are basically conceived of as voluntary associations that one chooses to join or not join, which is obviously very different from, say, class, race, and gender memberships. But this evasive ontology, which obfuscates the most central and obvious fact about all societies since humanity exited the hunting-and-gathering stage—viz, that they are characterized by oppressions of one kind or another—is not a definitional constituent of liberalism. Liberalism has certainly recognized some kinds of oppression: the absolutism it opposed in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, the Nazism and Stalinism it opposed in the twentieth century. Liberalism’s failure to systematically address structural oppression in supposedly liberal-democratic societies is a contingent artifact of the group perspectives and group interests privileged by those structures, not an intrinsic feature of liberalism’s conceptual apparatus.

#### Undercommon resistance strategies ultimately get coopted by authoritarianism– only the process of liberal reform can use critical values as a platform for liberal change to push the state out of its perpetual state of crisis

Conrad 19 – Australian-born academic specialising in English literature [Peter Conrad; A Thousand Small Sanities: The Moral Adventure of Liberalism by Adam Gopnik – review; May 12, 2019; <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/may/12/a-thousand-small-sanities-moral-adventure-liberalism-adam-gopnik-review>] mp \*edited for ableist language//recut

Liberalism has become a tricky and even dirty term, which may be why it is banished to the subtitle of Adam Gopnik’s supremely intelligent but tortuous polemical essay. American leftwingers nowadays avoid the adjective and prefer to call themselves “progressive”. And just what kind of “moral adventure” does Gopnik have in mind? Amoral options abound: liberality sounds spendthrift and libertinism is certainly decadent. Delacroix envisaged Liberty as a bare-breasted free spirit storming the revolutionary barricades; Bartholdi, designing the statue in New York harbour, dressed her in a ballgown, gave her a spiked crown and made her balefully scowl. Is she a permissive mistress or an antiquated matron whose torch looks like a bludgeon? These are more than semantic queries, because Gopnik alerts us to an emergency. “Gangster-style authoritarianism” threatens the US, Russia, Hungary, Brazil, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia, while our own lying Brexiters prate about national grandeur and use “parliamentary proceduralism”, as Gopnik shrewdly says, **to “corrupt and co-opt potential resistance”.** Can liberal values be revived to save us? Given the prevailing gloom, Gopnik’s definition of liberalism is cautious and it depends on two words whose awkwardness, odd in such an elegant writer, betrays their doubtful appeal. One is “fallibilism”, the other is “imperfectability”: we are a shoddy species, unworthy of utopia. I’d have thought that this was reason for conservatively upholding the old order, but for Gopnik it’s our recidivism that makes liberal reform so necessary. We must always try to do better, cleaning up our messes. The ~~sanity~~ in the book’s title extends to sanitation: Gopnik whimsically honours the sewerage system of Victorian London as a shining if smelly triumph of liberal policy. Gopnik wants liberals to be passionate, patriotic and public-minded, not passive, planetary and private Liberalism here is less a philosophy or an ideology than a temperament and a way of living. Gopnik regards sympathy with others, not the building of walls and policing of borders, as the basis of community. “Love is love,” he avers, and “kindness is everything”. Both claims, he insists, are “true. Entirely true”, if only because the Beatles say so. But are they truths or blithe truisms? Such soothing mantras would not have disarmed the neo-Nazi thugs who marched through Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017 or the white supremacist who murdered Jo Cox. Gopnik calls Trump “half-witted” and says Nigel Farage is a “transparent nothing”, but snubs do not diminish the menace of these dreadful men. Rather than confronting immediate challenges, Gopnik turns aside to ponder a succession of “lyrical love stories” involving people whose conduct he admires – the “intellectual idyll” of JS Mill and Harriet Taylor, the high-minded alliance of George Eliot and GH Lewes and the libertarian rampages of the “lovable terrorist” Emma Goldman, who in 1892 helped her boyfriend buy a gun with which he shot an obnoxious tycoon. Above all, Gopnik lavishes this liberal sentimentality on his nearest and dearest. His book is dedicated to his father and intermittently addressed to his daughter; it begins with his attempt to console her after Trump’s election, during a depressed nocturnal ramble through the New York streets. Beyond his household, Manhattan is Gopnik’s comfort zone. On the streets of his affluent East Side neighbourhood, he celebrates “the beautiful unpredictable bumping-into of city life” as proof that “self-organising” liberals can work small miracles. American liberalism is inconceivable, he says, without bohemian Greenwich Village. There is a brief excursion to Brooklyn to see Hasidic Jews and Muslims harmoniously cohabiting and a summer trip to the “liberal hotbed” of Cape Cod, where the Obamas and Clintons also holidayed; otherwise, the narrow island is Gopnik’s oasis. Far from appeasing disgruntled coal miners or opioid-zonked welfare claimants out in the red states, he cherishes the metropolitan exclusivity that populists hate. A staff writer at the New Yorker, he treats that publication as a synonym for the liberal task of endless reform and revaluation. “A society, like a weekly magazine, is one long perpetual crisis,” he says with a weary sigh. “Solving this crisis long enough to get to the next one is the work we do.” Those solutions rely on quick-thinking ingenuity and Gopnik’s version of liberalism translates “constant adaptation” into a brilliant display of dialectical thinking. Mostly the symmetries make sense, as when he says: “Liberalism isn’t a political theory applied to life. It’s what we know about life applied to a political theory.” But I’m still confused by a paragraph that relates social democracy to the innovations of the Byrds and ends by declaring that “the difference between Dylanised Beatles and Beatleised Dylans seemed small but meant everything”.

### Case

#### Moten and Harney agree.

Webb 18 (Darren; PGR Programme Director Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of Sheffield, “Bolt-Holes and Breathing Spaces in the System: On Forms of Academic Resistance (or, Can the University Be a Site of Utopian Possibility?),” Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 03/15/2018, pp. 96–118)

It is easy to be seduced by the language of the undercommons. Embodying and enacting it, however, is difficult indeed. Being within and against the university, refusing the call to order through insolent obstructive unprofessionalism, is almost impossible to sustain. Halberstam (2009, 45) describes the undercommons as “a marooned community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of rigor, excellence, and productivity.” A romantic and appealing notion for sure but refusing and reneging on “the university of excellence” will cost you your job. When Moten describes subversion as a “series of immanent upheavals” expressed through “vast repertoires of high-frequency complaints, imperceptible frowns, withering turns, silent sidesteps, and ever-vigilant attempts not to see and hear” (2008, 1743), one is reminded instantly of Thomas Docherty, disciplined and suspended for his negative vibes.7 Being with and for the maroon community is difficult too. First of all, “Where and how can we find/see the Undercommons at work?” (Ĉiĉigoj, Apostolou-Hölscher, and Rusham 2015, 265). Where and how can one find those liminal spaces of sabotage and subversion, and how does one occupy them in a spirit of hapticality, study, and militant arrhythmia that brings the utopic underground to the surface of the fierce and urgent now? Beautiful language, but how does one live it? Networks do, of course, exist—the Undercommoning Collective, the Edu-Factory Collective, the International Network for Alternative Academia, to name but a few. These are promising spaces for bringing together and harboring the maroons and the fugitives. But networks are typically short-lived, and—as Harney and Moten warned—there is a danger of institutionalization, of taking institutional practices with you into alternative spaces “because we’ve been inside so much” (Harney and Moten 2013, 148). And so, predictably, meetings of the fugitives come with structure, order, an official agenda, and circulated minutes. The outcasts convene in conventional academic conferences, with parallel sessions, panels of papers, lunch breaks, wine and nibbles (e.g., Edu-Factory 2012). These spaces offer time out, welcome respite, a breathing space, a trip abroad, and then one returns to work. If hapticality, the touch of the undercommons, is “a visceral register of experience … the feel that what is to come is here” (Bradley 2014, 129–130), then this seems elusive. It is hard to detect a sense of the utopic undercommons rising to the surface of the corporate-imperial university. Moten describes the call to disorder and to study as a way to “excavate new aesthetic, political, and economic dispositions” (Moten 2008, 1745). But this notion of excavating is highly problematic. It is common within the discourse of “everyday utopianism”—finding utopia in the everyday, recovering lost or repressed transcendence in “everydayness” (Gardiner 2006)—to describe the process of utopian recovery in terms of excavating: excavating repressed desires, submerged longings, suppressed histories, untapped possibilities. But the fundamental questions of where to dig and how to identify a utopian “find” are never adequately addressed (see Webb 2017). Gardiner defines utopia as “a series of forces, tendencies and possibilities that are immanent in the here and now, in the pragmatic activities of everyday life” (2006, 2). But how are these forces, tendencies and possibilities to be identified and recovered? For Harney and Moten, it is through study, hapticality and militant arrhythmia. These are slippy concepts, however, evading concrete material referents. What is it to inhabit the undercommons? Those who have written of their experiences refer to “small acts of marronage” such as poaching resources and redeploying them in ways at odds with the university’s designs and demands (Reddy 2016, 7), or exploiting funding streams “to form cracks in the institution that enable the Others to invade the university” (Smith, Dyke, and Hermes 2013, 150). For Adusei-Poku (2015), the undercommons is a space of refuge which is all about survival (2015, 4–5). We who feel homeless in the university are forced into refuge. We gather together to survive. We may gain satisfaction from small acts of marronage, but this is less about bringing the utopic common underground to the surface as it is a form of “radical escapism” (Adusei-Poku 2015, 4). Benveniste (2015, v) tells us that: “The undercommons has no set location and no return address. There is no map for entering and no guide for staying. The only condition is a living appetite. Listen to its hunger for difference.” We need more than poetry, however. And we need more than a series of minor acts of resistance. As Srnicek and Williams rightly emphasize, resistance is a defensive, reactive gesture, resisting against. Resistance is not a utopian endeavour: “We do not resist a new world into being” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 47). The undercommons, when one can find it, is a bolt hole, a place of refuge, a breathing space in the system. We need something more.

#### Investing in the public commons is good.

Azmanova & Mihai, ’15 (Albena; Mihaela; Albena Azmanova teaches political and social theory at the University of Kent's Brussels School of International Studies; Mihaela Mihai is Senior Research Fellow in Politics and International Relations at the School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh; Kent Academic Repository; “Reclaiming Democracy: Judgment, Responsibility and the Right to Politics;” https://kar.kent.ac.uk/58795/1/INTRO\_Reclaiming\_Democracy.pdf)//ILake-EF

Given the contours of the account of democratic politics sketched here, it is important to emphasise that this book positions itself in opposition to recent contributions to democratic theory. Upon analysing the ever-diminishing space for meaningful democratic deliberations, some have proposed that we should tame our democratic expectations and calibrate our theorising in line with these new political realities. In an age when politics is experienced through the mass media as appearance and manipulation, in times of personalised politics and increased discretionary power of the executive, leaders produce public opinion rather than respond to it. We are told that in such circumstances, the time for an “ocular” understanding of representative democracy has arrived. Representative of this take on contemporary democracy is Jeffrey Green’s widely discussed The Eyes of the People: Democracy in the Age of Spectatorship, where the author invites the audience to reconcile itself with the idea that vocal models of democracy are out of touch with the ways in which citizens experience politics nowadays. A more relevant and useful matrix for thinking about democracy today would be, the argument goes, to focus on the eyes of the people as the locus of political empowerment. Most of our political experience is reduced to listening and watching professional politicians speaking on our behalf, so much so that the majority of citizens are not decision-makers, but spectators who relate to politics with their eyes. Given this reality, democratic theory is invited to reinvent itself “in a manner that respects the everyday structure of political experience” (Green 2010, 4–6). Sceptical of the impact the voice of the people can have today, Green proposes that the gaze of the people, which inspects and tries to capture leaders off guard, in moments of candour, can ensure surveillance over the leadership. A plebiscitary – rather than a deliberative or participatory – model of democracy is thus deemed appropriate for the age we live in: “the plebiscitary model I shall defend strives for ideals especially suitable to the fallen conditions that shape the way democracy has come to be experienced today” (Green 2010, 7). Nowadays, he urges, politics is not about participative goal setting and deliberative decision making, it is mostly about empowering – an admittedly imperfectly legitimate – political class to govern. Popular empowerment lies with watching the leaders in a matter that examines, supervises, inspects and scrutinises. XX Such a scenario of the democratic game does allow the public to increase the pressures on elites for reason-giving and justification, And while Green admits the elite of participating citizens – the most likely audience for his book – will find his proposal problematic, he concludes that, for the mass of citizens, plebiscitary democracy is a more appropriate ideal. Green’s diagnosis of the contemporary predicament might be correct; yet his fallacy (and the quiet folly of traditional social theory more generally2 ) is that he takes “the everyday structure of political experience” as a given. He discusses “the fallen conditions that shape the way democracy has come to be experienced today” as unalterable and asks us to adjust to these conditions. In the silent and sanitised world of ocular democracy, where the “masses” **have no other political vocation** but to bestow their blessing on politicians and experts, or sanction them with silent disapproval, **the right to politics is demoted to a right to be governed**.3 Green’s attempt to build an ethical model on the poor conditions of democracy today amounts to an invitation to theoretical resignation; it trivialises critique and should therefore look suspicious to those who believe in the necessity of reclaiming politics from technocrats, professionals and “saviours” of all stripes and colours, i.e. from the often impermeable and unaccountable class of political leaders. It is oblivious of the wisdom of the first, and often most insightful, adepts of democracy – that democracy is more than granting rulers a popular mandate to rule. In highlighting the power of democratic legitimacy and the fallibility of democratic governance, James Madison has warned that **giving democratic form to despotic rule** is among the greatest of political calamities.4 Democratic, responsive, power is neither always responsible, nor always competent, as Alexis de Tocqueville already observed at the dawn of modern democratic government, because “the men who are entrusted with the direction of public affairs … are frequently inferior, in both capacity and morality, …are unskilful and sometimes contemptible”, while exercising arbitrary power “still greater than in despotic states” (Tocqueville, 1990 [1838]: 240-241, 209. Contra Green and in tune with Madison’s and Tocqueville’s warnings, this collection seeks to capture the background conditions that make democracy – not ocular or spectatorial, but participatory and contestatory democracy – possible again. We should not reconcile ourselves with the diagnosis of the shrinking of the realm of politics and adjust the format of democracy, and the nature of critique, to that reality. **Focusing on the gaze is futile, nay, perilous, if citizens have no power to shape the reality they perceive**. Access to a wealth of information does not increase control over the very production of information. The worrisome ascent of far right, populist parties across Europe highlights the dangers of placing our hopes in the people’s supervisory capacities. Populist leaders candidly provide the kind of theatre that can entrance the vision of the demos and supply it with ready-made, simplistic and deceiving visions of who is culpable for its woes.

#### Debt DA: Debt is good! It halts existential risks

Joshua Zoffer 20, Investor at Cove Hill Partners, Fellow at New America, JD Candidate at Yale University Law School, AB from Harvard University, “To End Forever War, Keep the Dollar Globally Dominant”, The New Republic, 2/3/2020, https://newrepublic.com/article/156417/end-forever-war-keep-dollar-globally-dominant

In early 2016, Obama Treasury Secretary Jack Lew cautioned that the dollar’s dominance as a global currency rested, in part, on the U.S. government’s reluctance to fully weaponize it. If foreign markets and governments “feel that we will deploy sanctions without sufficient justification or for inappropriate reasons,” he warned, “we should not be surprised if they look for ways to avoid doing business in the United States or in U.S. dollars.” Lew’s case stemmed from the more fundamental view that the dollar’s international role is “a source of tremendous strength for our economy, a benefit for U.S. companies and a driver of U.S. global leadership”—in other words, a role worth keeping. This view is emblematic of American financial governance since the Second World War. U.S. economic analysts, especially at the Treasury, have jealously guarded the dollar’s role and the many benefits it offers: the ability to run large deficits at low cost and disproportionate influence over the structure of the global economy, among others. Yet in their recent article in The New Republic, David Adler and Daniel Bessner argue the U.S. should abandon these advantages. In their view, the dollar’s role has encouraged American militarism and should be relinquished to curb such behavior. Dollar hegemony is not without cost, but to renounce it would be a profound mistake. Adler and Bessner’s view neglects the sizable economic benefits the dollar’s role confers on the U.S., as well as its possible use as an antidote to military adventurism. It ignores the enormous good that can be done with deficit spending, much of which has gone to the American military but could instead fund progressive programs. And it elides the inability of the U.S. and its global trading partners to shift away from dollar dominance without creating worldwide financial distress. Adler and Bessner are right that the U.S. has misused its privilege, but Washington should not abandon it; rather, American leaders should seek to transform it. Generations of American policymakers have been right to protect the dollar’s key currency role for economic reasons. Most notably, dollar hegemony affords the U.S. the ability to run large and prolonged budget and balance-of-payments deficits. The dollar represents 62 percent of allocated foreign exchange reserves, is used to invoice and settle roughly half of world trade, and accounts for 42 percent of global payments. Because governments, banks, and businesses worldwide need lots of dollars, the world market always stands ready to absorb new U.S.-dollar-denominated debt without charging higher interest rates. Adler and Bessner correctly point out that the rest of the world considers the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency to be an “exorbitant privilege,” a term coined in the 1960s by then French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard D’Estaing. The ability to spend beyond its means has enabled the U.S. to fund its impressive military might, whether one views that power as the fountainhead of Pax Americana or the source of illegitimate military adventurism. But these economic benefits go beyond just deficits. The demand for dollars also pushes up the dollar’s value against other currencies, enhancing American purchasing power and offering consumers access to imports on the cheap. The dollar’s role also means American firms rarely need to do business in foreign currencies, reducing transaction costs and exchange-rate risks. More broadly, America’s central economic role gives it outsize influence at crucial moments. At the height of the financial crisis that began in 2008, the Federal Reserve was able to inject vital liquidity into the global financial system by selectively offering dollar swap lines to trusted foreign central banks. Dollar hegemony enabled the U.S. to act swiftly, effectively, and on its own terms. In addition, the dollar’s role offers a potent alternative to kinetic military action as a means of pursuing foreign policy objectives. The dollar’s broad use means access to dollar liquidity—which in turn requires access to the U.S. financial system—is essential for foreign governments and businesses. For foreign banks, especially, being cut off from dollar access is essentially a death sentence. That makes sanctions that do so a powerful tool in the international arena. In 2005, for example, the U.S. used the dollar to strike a devastating blow against North Korea without firing a single shot or even formally enacting sanctions. Using authority provided by Section 311 of the Patriot Act, the Department of the Treasury crippled Banco Delta Asia, a bank accused of facilitating illegal activity by the North Korean government, by merely threatening to cut off its access to the American financial system. Deposit outflows began within days; within weeks the bank was placed under government administration to avoid a full collapse. Pyongyang was hit hard, as other banks ceased their business with it to avoid meeting the same fate. Similarly, though the Trump administration has worked hard to undo it, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran to limit the development of nuclear weapons was made possible, in part, by painful dollar sanctions that brought Iran to the table. Far from being a proximate cause of military conflict, the dollar’s central global role has often been used to contain adversaries without military intervention. Still, skeptics are right to point out that the dollar’s role has indirectly funded American interventionism and that dollar sanctions have been overused, provoking the ire of American allies. But these facts suggest we should use our dollar power to forge a more progressive U.S. order, not abandon the advantage altogether. America’s exorbitant privilege need not fund warships and missiles: The same low-interest borrowing could be used to fund a new universal health care system, expand access to higher education, or pursue any number of large-scale social policy objectives, including financing global public goods that no other country or consortium of countries is prepared to fund, such as climate change mitigation.

#### The creditor-debtor relationship is good—eliminating that relationship causes foreign banks to invest in unsafe assets instead---that leads to global bubbles that collapse the economy

The Economist ’15 (The Economist, “Dominant and dangerous,” 2 October 2015, https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21669875-americas-economic-supremacy-fades-primacy-dollar-looks-unsustainable-dominant-and)

Americans may wonder why this matters to them. They did not force any country to link its currency to the dollar or encourage foreign firms to issue dollar debt. But the dollar’s outsize role does affect Americans. It brings benefits, not least cheaper borrowing. Alongside the “exorbitant privilege” of owning the reserve currency, however, there are costs. If the Fed fails to act as lender of last resort in a dollar liquidity crisis, the ensuing collapse abroad will rebound on America’s economy. And even without a crisis, the dollar’s dominance will present American policymakers with a dilemma. If foreigners continue to accumulate reserves, they will dominate the Treasury market by the 2030s. To satisfy growing foreign demand for safe dollar-denominated assets, America’s government could issue more Treasuries—adding to its debts. Or it could leave foreigners to buy up other securities—but that might lead to asset bubbles, just as in the mortgage boom of the 2000s.

**Economic decline causes nuclear war – loose nukes, counterbalancing, and regional instability**

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The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how **economic considerations within states can figure prominently into the calculus for future conflicts**. The findings also suggest that **security issues with economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another**. The research shows that **security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the inherent vulnerabilities within global financial markets will present new challenges for national security, and provide developing states new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states.**¶ **The security areas**, identified in the proceeding chapters, **are likely to mature into global security threats in the immediate future**. As the case study on South Korea suggest, **the overlapping security issues associated with economic decline and reduced military spending by the United States will affect allied confidence in America’s security guarantees**. The study shows that **this outcome could cause regional instability or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security**. **Rival states and non-state groups may also become emboldened to challenge America’s status** in the unipolar international system.¶ **The potential risks associated with stolen or loose WMD**, **resulting from poor security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security**. The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North Korea show how **financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and how financial factors can influence WMD proliferation** by contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The **inherent vulnerabilities within the global financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other non-state groups**, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, **with opportunities to disrupt global finance and perhaps weaken America’s status**. A more ominous threat originates from states intent on increasing diversification of foreign currency holdings, establishing alternatives to the dollar for international trade, or engaging financial warfare against the United States.

#### Fight for the academic commons – don’t retreat to the undercommons – ceding the public and civil basis of the university empowers corporate takeover. Struggle for academic future accepts a university to come instead of resigning to a corporate future.

Casey **SHOOP** Core Teaching Faculty in the Robert D. Clark Honors College, University of Oregon ‘**19** http://post45.research.yale.edu/2019/02/angela-davis-the-l-a-rebellion-and-the-undercommons/

For Harney and Moten, viewed from the far side of what they perceive to be the fulfilled neoliberalization of higher education, Davis's precarious teaching position is no doubt marked in advance by its imminent "fugitivity," the crimininalization of her classroom already evidence of the future anterior tense of the undercommons — what will have been driven underground. And they are not wrong: when the Regents lose the First Amendment case against Davis et. al. in state court, they nonetheless find the spurious grounds to fire her anyway on the basis of the impropriety of her public speeches. "Her labor," to quote Harney and Moten once again (if now with special resonance), "is as necessary as it is unwelcome. The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings."66 But unwelcome for whom? Certainly not the students, the faculty and the legal team who organized in defense of her right to teach in the University of California. Harney and Moten's view of the public university risks ceding too much to the forces devoted to its hostile takeover. This is why it is worth insisting on the scene of Davis's teaching as an event of active struggle in and for the commons of the public university.

Offering what they forthrightly call a "bad reading" of Jacques Derrida's essay, "The Age of Hegel," Harney and Moten affirm that teaching is an operation of "that onto/auto-encyclopedic circle of the state" that Derrida calls the Universitas.67 In a sustained engagement with Hegel's 1822 report to the Prussian Minister of Education, Derrida tracks the way in which Hegel's own philosophical system at once mirrors the state's ambition to impose a worldview and exceeds that very ambition by demonstrating the local limits of its claim to encyclopedic totality. The deconstructive lesson for Derrida is that one must remain both for and against the university, within and without its context for thought at the same time. Sympathetic to Derrida's reading, Harney and Moten nonetheless seek to question the political price of this undecidability, no doubt with an eye toward the contemporary lumpen-professoriat that increasingly supports and sustains such interrogation. Derrida's conclusion, however, is worth quoting in full because of how fully it speaks to the situation at the University of California in the late sixties:

Whatever the particular forces in 'civil society' may be that dispose over the power of the State, every university as such (be it on the "right" or the "left") depends upon this model. Since this model (which, by definition, claims universality) is always in negotiated compromise with the forces of a particular State (Prussian, Napoleonic—I and II—republican-bourgeois, Nazi, fascist, social democratic, popular democratic, or socialist), the deconstruction of its concepts, instruments and practices cannot proceed by attacking it immediately and attempting to do away with it without risking the immediate return of other forces that would welcome its disappearance. Immediately to cede and make way for the other of the Universitas might represent a welcome invitation to those very determinate and very determined forces, ready and waiting, close by, to take over the State and the University. Whence the necessity for a deconstruction not to abandon the terrain of the University when it begins to come to grips with its most powerful foundations.68

As we have already seen, the Reaganite forces of privatization were not only "ready and waiting," in Derrida's terms, to radically alter the liberal agenda of public education, but also calculatedly misrepresented the students themselves as precisely the "immediate" (i.e., internal) attack upon the university and its institutions that would alibi this rollback. Far from a kind of professional "negligence," the critical ambivalence of deconstruction seems like a matter of tactical foresight.

But if the events around Angela Davis's hiring and firing might be said to augur the rise the of the neoliberal university and the downward pressures upon the undercommons, they also offer a promissory instance of what Derrida elsewhere calls the "university to come." By this figuration Derrida imagines that

the new responsibility of the "thinking" of which we are speaking cannot fail to be accompanied, at least, by a movement of suspicion, even of rejection with respect to the professionalization of the university [...] which regulates university life according to the supply and demand of the marketplace and according to a purely technical idea of competence.69

The conception of freedom embodied in the Black liberation struggle, and on offer in Davis's course and in the films of the L.A. Rebellion filmmakers, is perhaps one name for this unrealized futurity. And it bears remembering that for the large majority of Davis's colleagues, her labor was both necessary and welcome. A less spectacular and therefore less remembered aspect of Angela Davis's case involved the UCLA Academic Senate's resolution to condemn the Regents, repudiate their support for the 1950 anti-communist policy and affirm her employment for the full two-year term of her original contract: As UCLA historian Gary B. Nash remembers:

1,673 faculty members had already petitioned the Regents, remonstrating against "that revolution, the unprecedented action of the board of Regents in summarily suspending the power of administration offices and intruding upon the process of evaluation of academic qualifications by peers, which is essential to a great university," and then had called upon the regents "to withdraw from a course fraught with peril for the future of the university."70

More astonishing than these formal, and largely symbolic, responses to the Regents' overreach, however, was the large-scale mobilization by student protestors and the decision of the Academic Senate to establish the Angela Y. Davis Fund Committee to raise money from faculty and staff to replace the salary that the Regents were set on withdrawing in the fall of 1970. Nash was put in charge of the committee and tasked with the collection of funds. He said:

We asked for three quarterly installments at the following rates: assistant professors ten dollars, associate professors twelve, and full professors fifteen [...] Between July 6 and July 30, when I made out the first check, which was for support of her July salary, 287 contributors had sent checks for a total of $4,505.71

Only one check was distributed a few days before the San Rafael courtroom shooting that would force Angela Davis underground and on the run, but those events should not eclipse this heroic act of faculty collectivization in support of their most precarious member. In defiance of the Regents and courting direct confrontation, their actions constitute what might be called an archaeology of the unmade future of public education in California. In this optative mood, Professor Nash recalls the faculty senate meeting in anticipation of further Regental action to strip Davis's courses of not only credit but a place to teach them:

She would have shown up on campus. Her course, a course of her preference and supported by the department of philosophy, would have been open to students. As a very controversial figure, students would have swarmed the course and if the registrar had refused to assign a classroom to it in deference to regental action, then the course would have taken place in the quadrangle there with the philosophy department's building on one side and the architecture school, and that would in effect have thrown the ball back into the Regents' court. What would they do to silence her? What would they do to punish students who took the course? What would they do to hundreds and hundreds of faculty members who were supporting her salary while she taught?72

The proper name for this prospective scene of teaching outside and between buildings is the commons, and the "university to come" also resides in the promissory significance of such past moments, however unrealized, when common cause in the interest of the public university's mission does not blink in the face of its imminent dispossession by the ideology of the market. As Derrida argues:

In a period of "crisis," as we say, a period of decadence and renewal, when the institution is "on the blink," provocation to think brings together in the same instant the desire for memory and exposure to the future, the fidelity of a guardian faithful enough to want to keep even the chance of a future, in other words, the singular responsibility of what he does not have and of what is not yet.73

What Derrida calls this "desire for memory" might be repurposed for an activist future in the protection and advancement of the precariat, to serve here as a ward against the cynical negligence that Harney and Moten diagnose in neoliberal academia. But the film production of the L.A. Rebellion and the teaching scene of Angela Davis indicate that we needn't wait for the messianic time invoked by Derrida as an act of fidelity to the unmet promise of the public university. At the tail-end of the sixties, the resources of the Black radical tradition had already turned the public university inside out in the manner that Nash only retrospectively imagines. Life on the streets of Watts, the internal colonization of the African American community and its connection to the broader Third World decolonization movements, Black life as the subject of philosophy and film — these issues moved suddenly, if only for a short term, from the periphery of the public university to its center. Taken together, the brief institutional occupation by both philosopher and filmmakers points the way toward the realization of the Master Plan for Higher Education in a radical pedagogy devoted to social justice and equality. Little wonder, therefore, that this labor was fugitive before it began, a threat to the Right-wing vision of privatized education so extreme that it must be criminalized. I have tried to suggest here that Davis's course itself, alongside those films of the L.A. Rebellion filmmakers who realized in their artistic production the expanded social vision of the public university, might be said to constitute evidence of what Davis called, in her third lecture, a "hiatus, the break between the noble moral ideas of western society in general and in particular." They teach us to think meta-reflexively about the concept of freedom — in the break between the promise of the public university as commons and its neoliberal fulfillment as the institution that sits above the undercommons.

#### Undercommons not separable from university – saying so relies on a strict separation between inside and outside. Radical solutions must combine both the reform and revolution.

Boston, PhD Candidate, 16

(Amanda, <http://bostonreview.net/forum/black-study-black-struggle/amanda-boston-amanda-boston-response-robin-kelley> 3-7)

The undercommons is alive and well from UCLA to Brown and beyond, as students and faculty work in community to trouble the constraints of the political, social, gendered, racial, and economic orders. But the undercommons is not wholly separate from the university. Its “undisciplined assembly” is shaped by the resources that the university provides, as well as by the exploitative practices that make those resources available. As we engage in critical knowledge production that is not limited to university- and state-sanctioned curricula, we should not lose sight of the work that must also be done to envision and create a different kind of university. Kelley identifies what he sees as contradictory impulses between reform and revolution. I would suggest, instead, that there is a need for a sustained coalition between self-identified radical and reformist contingents of student activists, and that this is analogous to the complex relationship between the undercommons and the university that it rejects. The conventional rigid dichotomy between reform and revolution has been detrimental to progressive and radical movements alike. It has stunted alliances that could engender durable social transformation while meeting people’s needs through concrete action—for example, alliances between students, faculty, and campus workers, who are less likely to have the ear of university administrators. Reform is not a panacea for the problems facing universities. Similarly, radical solutions sought while in the university, no matter how subversive the space from which one speaks, are likely to be only partially effective. Therefore it is necessary and desirable for students to direct their energies toward both reformist and revolutionary kinds of action. History has shown that many revolutions began with reformist agendas. The multifaceted nature of black struggles in particular requires the exhaustion of all strategies, radical and reformist. The Mississippi Freedom Schools that Kelley highlights as an antecedent to the undercommons were no different. Not only did activists engage in the radical work of cultivating a liberative political consciousness and new social identities in rural black communities, they did so with the goal of cultivating indigenous leadership and enabling disenfranchised black people to participate in—and then transform—American democracy. Reformist activities have also led to the eventual radicalization of many individuals. As one prominent example, decades of reformist work ushered Martin Luther King, Jr., into a radical, vocal criticism of American empire. What would a merger of reformist and radical elements in the ongoing black and allied student movements look like? It would include a call for reform that does not stifle more radical demands, and which does not consider incremental change in campus culture an end in itself, but rather a step in the long process of transformative struggle. Moreover, it would agree that this struggle is not confined by campus walls or to only faculty and student concerns. At the same time, it would seek a brand of radicalism that does not unequivocally reject incremental change because it falls short of revolution. It would move beyond the public performance of trauma, grief, and outrage—admittedly instrumental to gaining national attention—to now focus attention on students’ generative demands and their relationships to broader struggles against disenfranchisement and exploitation. It would require students to not lose sight of the privileges a college or graduate education affords, even as they fight their marginalization within universities. Critically, this collaborative effort would prioritize building networks of activism that outlast students’ tenures at their universities. Such networks should facilitate not only issue-based activism, but also the often slow, unglamorous work of training leaders and organizers, and guaranteeing continuity of knowledge about resources and past successes and failures. The durability of these networks would necessitate the inclusion of faculty and staff, whose longer-term stakes in the university make them key players in the creation and retention of movement memory, as well as uniquely capable of anchoring long-term transformation. This repurposing of the university and its resources toward revolutionary aims would not hinge on a specific, unpredictable historical moment of collective effervescence. Rather, it would enable a more sustainable model of activism that is capable of bringing justice and reform in the here and now, without sacrificing the durable goals and liberative potential of the radical imagination.

#### Framing the university as an undercommons locks them into a strong ontological state that undermines the ability for political challenges to the problems Moten criticizes

Katja Čičigoj ’14 [Stefan Apostolou-Hölscher and Martina Ruhsam, The Inflexions of the Undercommons, Lingering Ghosts: (Un)Answered Questions, (Un)Present Speakers, (Un)Read Books and Readers?, http://www.inflexions.org/radicalpedagogy/n8\_tangent\_cicigojapostolou-holscherruhsam.html]

What are the Undercommons then? In their groundbreaking essay The University and the Undercommons Harney and Moten describe a tendency that is not only valid for the contemporary academia in the US but has also been unfolding on a rather international level, the latest since the Bologna reforms were decided by 29 European ministers of education in 1999. Harney and Moten paradoxically identify the idea of universitas as such with its professionalization and thereby – being inspired by the operaist assumption that living labor would always be creative whilst capital could only react to its inventions – juxtapose the mass intellectuality of what they call the Undercommons with a privatization of (knowledge) practices through their imprisonment inside the walls of the academia: “The Universitas is always a state/ State strategy,“ they claim. In comparison the Undercommons as maroons rather act against their administration by state apparatuses. PERSISTENT QUESTIONS 1. ONTO-METHODOLOGY: creation of concepts (D&G): theory/philosophy as poetic practice versus a scientific attitude of understanding the world - raised as a problem of metaphoric poetic language, this may be more than a mere question of rhetorics: PHILOSOPHICAL-POLITICAL POIESIS can amount also to the CREATION OF POLITICAL IMAGINATION against “capitalist realism” - i.e. recognizing the immense political productivity and creativity of innumerable practical readings of concepts such as the Multitude, the Commons, and the Empire from Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt or performativity from Judith Butler – regardless of what our theoretical assessment of them might be in terms of how much they “scientifically” can correspond to concrete social realities. - so what is the poetic practice of the Undercommons as a concept? Can we envisage its political poesis (and how to think of it in this temporal order, if the Undercommons is always already here – see next point)? 2. EPISTEMOLOGY/POLITCS: Where and how can we find/see the Undercommons at work? If they are always already here, they risk becoming ubiquitous and we risk not to spot them... And on the other hand – why should we spot them at all, if they are always already here? - There seems to be an onto-political tension between “THE ALWAYS ALREADY” and “the contrary to what is”: between assigning value to the potential of what is already (the undercommons of study as always already going on) AND DEMANDING A RADICAL CHANGE OR BRAKE, infrastructural change etc. (for if what we are looking for is already here – it seems we necessitate no political work anymore) Does the recognition of the “always already” of the undercommons call for being complemented by political work on what is not (yet)? Can we think of these two attitudes together, but not merely in terms of a complementary “peaceful coexistence”? Can they inform each other – and how? About the Undercommons as Being... Always Already There “They saw our bad debt coming a mile off. [...] Anywhere bad debt elaborates itself. Anywhere you can stay, conserve yourself, plan. A few minutes, a few days when you cannot hear them say there is something wrong with you.” The Undercommons – Against Politics? The intentional work of subjects towards a clear goal: “Our task is the self-defence of the surround in the face of repeated, targeted dispossessions through the settler’s armed incursion. And while acquisitive violence occasions this self-defence, it is recourse to self-possession in the face of dispossession (recourse, in other words, to politics) that represents the real danger. Politics is an ongoing attack on the common – the general and generative antagonism – from within the surround” […] We surround democracy’s false image in order to unsettle it. Every time it tries to enclose us in a decision, we’re undecided. Every time it tries to represent our will, we’re unwilling” (Harney & Moten 17-19). An abdication of political responsibility? OK. Whatever. We’re just anti-politically romantic about actually existing social life. We aren’t responsible for politics. We are the general antagonism to politics looming outside every attempt to politicise, every imposition of self-governance, every sovereign decision and its degraded miniature, every emergent state and home sweet home. We are disruption and consent to disruption. We preserve upheaval. Sent to fulfil by abolishing, to renew by unsettling, to open the enclosure whose immeasurable venality is inversely proportionate to its actual area, we got politics surrounded. We cannot represent ourselves. We can’t be represented.” 3. THE INFORMAL/The need of FORMATION/DIS-/RE-FORMATION: – “the informal” is proposed by Harney and Moten as a way of thinking about the Undercommons; but when reflecting back on the specific conference set-up and how it worked out in the end in terms of in-forming the way our discussions proceeded, it struck me how perhaps what we think of as “the informal” is always already in-formed by pre-formed relations and positions (also in the specific case of this conference, but not only): how therefore a mere “via negative” of formal openness might not be enough for everyone to feel addressed and included (does everyone need to be addressed and included at all, however, or are we bound to always form specific regimes of address and inclusion/exclusion?) - The question might therefore not be how to form the informal (paradox?), but how can a pre-formed and informed “informal” set-up be dis-formed and re-formed otherwise in order to enable i.e. an emergence of a situation of study? - Is study really “the informal” or does it need some kind of form-ation to take place, to enable a study to occur? Is study itself a kind of dis- and re-formation, neither the formation ex nihilo, nor the creation of a supposed informal? 4. (IM)PATIENCE AND (LACK OF) RESULTS: - Bojana Kunst asked – why do we seem to be very patient when discussing the minute theoretical discrepancies, but impatient when faced with concrete practices and propositions? - To bring it further, does this indicate our inability to cross contextual boundaries or is there something inherent in contemporary modes of power operations that makes us prone to abstract assessment but reluctant to concrete propositions (unable to go “beyond the symptom”)? - Randy Martin asked whether our inclination towards self-assessment makes us perhaps too impatient to see and produce results. How to enable the afterlife of the conference to linger? Cartography of Symptomatic Developments and Problems 1. STRUCTURAL IMPOSSIBILITY Referring to the paradoxical situation in which we usually find ourselves if we – while claiming or aiming to be part of the undercommons – are deeply entangled with the problem of the commons as soon as we work to make a living. (This shaking standpoint can also be observed if artists criticize the institution in their work while their pieces or projects are passed on from institution to institution.) As soon as we have to earn money our hands become dirty

because we become part of the social/political system we try to oppose, hence it is difficult to draw a demarcation line between the commons and the undercommons or the critical academic and the subversive intellectual. Honestly speaking, all of us who are writing this, are entangled in both. Is there a critical culture that comprises both of them? (Ana Vujanović) Constantly being in modes of producing while the WORK IS OUTSOURCED TO PRIVATE SPACES in front of the computer (Bojana Cveijć) THE SHIFT FROM COLLABORATION AS A RESISTANT STRATEGY TO COLLABORATION AS A REQUIREMENT Whereas collaboration was conceived as a resistant mode of artistic production – related to a set of artistic and socio-political utopias in the 1960s, it has become an essential component and requirement for new modes of production in the context of neoliberalism and by now dismayingly resembles the dominant narrative of creative capitalism with its praise of plasticity, fluidity, networking, flexibility etc. (Boyan Manchev). One can observe a transformation of the aim to connect people and the whole discourse that evolved around relations and relational aesthetics (in the wake of Nicolas Bourriaud´s well-known book Relational Aesthetics) from being a critical tool to becoming a normative discourse or practise. What are the consequences of the institutionalisation of the discourse that evolved around intersubjective relations in the performing arts and how does this development react upon artistic practices and conversely? HAS THE SHIFT AWAY FROM THE PRODUCT AND TOWARDS THE PROCESS LOST ITS RESISTANT MOMENTUM? Boyan Manchev outlines that his move has once connoted a resistance against constant production and sprang from the belief that the process could not be commodified; that focussing on the process would hence be a gesture of resistance against the commodfication of art-objects. But in our stage of “performance capitalism” (Manchev) that pretends that there is no loss, no waste and no finitude, every resistant strategy can perfectly be appropriated by performance capitalism – the working process inclusively. A certain fetishisation of the process that followed the fetishisation of the object or product as an attempt to counter the latter resulted in the commodification of the artistic process or labour that are goods by themselves now (Sergej Pristaš). Are art institutions today places that are first and foremost dedicated to the promotion of artistic labour and the reproduction of consumer relations as Pristaš claims? THE COMMONS OF EDUCATION Education based on a rigid exchange of information, experiences and consensus whereas critique is in function of maintaining equilibrium. To resist the tendency that a fast accumulation of information becomes the ultimate goal (or exchange-product) in a university as privatized industry that trains flexible students to become quick absorbers in order to be fit for marketable pursuits. To Continue Proposing – Again and Again: Lines of Flight THE UNDERCOMMONS, THE INFORMAL & THEIR CRITIQUE OF SOVEREIGNTY The Undercommons are connected with the persistence of the informal that is in no account a mere natural occurrence but has to be on the contrary permanently created, organized and fostered. (Stefano Harney) This informal – as unfinished and vaguely wrong – can be a place of resistance against sovereign politics and is according to Harney´s explanation connected with the temporal condition of making and creating time and with a certain deregulation of the rigid organisation of universities in terms of spatial and temporal settings that would counter the rhythm of what he calls “synaptic labour” - understood as a constant reanimation or reassembling of the assembly line. This would lead to: COUNTERSPECULATION Study as a form of counterspeculation – dedicated to the question: how can we think outside or beyond the rhythms and the efficiency of synaptic labour? BUT “Would it not mean that to be critical of the university would make one the professional par excellence, more negligent than any other? To distance oneself professionally through critique, is this not the most active consent to privatize the social individual?” (Stefano Harney & Fred Moten) YET ANOTHER PARADOX How can I be an “emigrant from conscription” (Harney and Moten)? This could be the question of a professional who read the text of Harney and Moten and tries to thereafter engage into the diligent business of the emigrant that Harney and Moten call for. But this diligence would be one that follows a prescripted refuge and hence one that would be conscripted too. SO? COUNTERSPECULATION! DISORGANISATION The potential that a collective disorganised study might bear. A learning of/in/as disorganisation would have to invent and test possibilities to intervene. But isn´t it impossible to organize disorganisation? THE RIGHT OF A CERTAIN OBSCURITY OF PRODUCTION Today an artwork is not valorised after it is produced and shown, it is likely that the valorisation is imposed on the work beforehand in relation to a production of desire (Sergej Pristaš). RESISTANCE How can we resist the call of conscription as artists and avoid performing the perfectly flexible, mobile, precarious, creative individual (that could perfectly be recruited for any kind of challenging business or creative industry and nearby upgrades delapidated neighbourhoods)? How to counterpose the hegemonic demand to squeeze or exploit every potential relentlessly? THE INVENTION OF NEW SPACES AND CO-WORKING STRATEGIES The development of infrastructural facilities and the creation of situations that enable exchange without focussing exclusively on resulting products (for instance the ID\_Frankfurt: http://www.frankdances.org/idfrankfurt/) TO RISK THE ENDEAVOUR OF SPECULATIVE THINKING Semiotic politics often operate in terms of limiting imaginative capacities and solidifying the boundaries of the thinkable as defined by the context we are situated in. Hence, a radical break or rupture with the status quo would also demand an exodus from these prevailing semiotics in order to not operate “with the same weapons” that the enemy is using (to quote Mårten Spångberg referring to Levi Bryant) or in order to keep the semiotic system open for poietic in(ter)vention. Might adopting another perspective (the dog, the alien, the thing?) or conceiving another horizon of thought (a flat ontology) in the hope that this difference in perspective will enable us to change a certain structure, help? Do we have to re-think agency – assumed to be the priviledge of human individuals and groups – and shift our awareness to our alliances and interdependencies with non-human, inanimate, technological and alien entities? TO RECOGNISE ABUNDANCE IN THE PLACES OF ALLEGED SCARCITY SUBVERSIVE AFFIRMATION The boycott-group (assembled students of the Institute of Applied Theatre Studies at the Justus-Liebig-University in Gießen) presented their act of subversive affirmation in response to a call of the Maxim Gorki theatre in Berlin that invited young makers to present pieces under the motto “Rehearse rebellion” (“Aufstand proben”) in 2013. By occupying the stage of the theatre the boycott-group decided to refuse to perform if there are no fees for the performers but to perform this refusal on the stage of the theatre instead of dismissing the invitation. The group answered the call with an intrusion of the real and demonstrated real resistance against the exploitative working conditions imposed by the theatre instead of displaying a represented or rehearsed one. Is subversive affirmation one of the only options left? Do we have to use the institutions to articulate our refusals or counter-propositions in regard to the offered working conditions? Do we have to betray the dispositif of representation by still opting for being in it? How can we keep asking questions, stay curious and continue to make our voices heared while at the same time avoiding to perform a professional criticality – in the way Harney and Moten critizice it? How can we avoid a criticality that is performed in order to keep up a certain ritual of self-display as professional routine? How can we instead practice an affirmative criticality that is not resulting from a withdrawal into a distant position outside but that would spring from the wish to affirm and spur ways of thinking, doing and perceiving that don´t comply with the neoliberal rationale and its incessant search for marketable outputs? In this sense we would then ask – and persist to ask – not to keep the academic ritual going but as a matter of curiosity and real interest – how can we be critical in the closest proximity – by being commited to a passion of thinking that is dedicated to the poietic potential of theory and that scrutinizes categories and practices that pretend timeless stability or self-evident relevance? But a thinking that is not self-satisfied with the performance of its criticality. A thinking that ultimately seeks an affirmative performative practice. And one that claims time as the fundamental condition for any thought/practice/change to occur.

## 1NR

### Case

#### The impacts of literal debt o/w the impacts of asocial debt

Baum & Barrett ’18 (\*Seth D. Baum & \*\*Anthony M. Barrett. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute; 2018; “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks”; *Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing*; edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174-184)

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just” $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard risk equals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts. 3. Challenges To Analyzing GCR Given the goal of reducing GCR, one must know what the risks are and how they can be reduced. This requires diving into the details of the risks themselves—details that we largely skip in this paper—but it also requires attention to a few analytical challenges. The first challenge is the largely unprecedented nature of global catastrophes. Simply put, modern human civilization has never before ended. There have been several recent global catastrophes of some significance, the World Wars and the 1918 flu among them, but these clearly did not knock civilization out. Earlier catastrophes, including the prehistoric mass extinction events, the Toba volcanic eruption, and even the Black Death plague, all occurred before modern civilization existed. The GCR analyst is thus left to study risks of events that are in some way untested or unproven. But the lack of historical precedent does not necessarily imply a lack of ongoing risk. Indeed, the biggest mistake of naïve GCR analysis is to posit that, because no global catastrophe has previously occurred, therefore none will occur. This mistake comes in at least three forms. The first and most obviously false form is to claim that unprecedented events never occur. In our world of social and technological innovation, it is easy to see that this claim is false. But accounting for it in risk analysis still requires some care. One approach is to use what is known in probability theory as zero-failure data (Hanley 1983; Bailey 1997; Quigley and Revie 2011). Suppose that no catastrophe has occurred over n prior time periods—for example, there has been no nuclear war in the 65 years since two countries have had nuclear weapons. (The second country to build nuclear weapons was the Soviet Union, in 1949.) It can thus be said that there have been zero failures of nuclear deterrence in 65 cases. An approximate upper bound can then be estimated for the probability p of nuclear deterrence failure, i.e. the probability of nuclear war, occurring within an upcoming year. Specifically, p lies within the interval [0, u] with (1 – α) confidence, where u = 1 – α(1/n) gives the upper limit of the confidence interval. Thus for 95% confidence (α = 0.05), u = 1-0.05(1/65) = 0.05, meaning that there is a 95% chance that the probability of nuclear war within an upcoming year is somewhere between 0 and 0.05. Note that this calculation assumes (perhaps erroneously) that the 65 non-failures are independent random trials and that p is approximately constant over time, but it nonetheless provides a starting point for estimating the probability of unprecedented events. Barrett et al. (2013) uses a similar approach as part of a validation check of a broader risk analysis of U.S.-Russia nuclear war. The second form of the mistake is to posit that the ongoing existence of human civilization proves that global catastrophes will not occur. It is true that civilization’s continued existence despite some past threats should provide some comfort, but it should only provide some comfort. Consider this: if a global catastrophe had previously occurred, nobody would still be around to ponder the matter (at least for catastrophes causing human extinction). The fact of being able to observe one’s continued survival is contingent upon having survived. While it is easy to see that this is a mistake, it is harder to correct for it. Again, it requires careful application of probability theory, correcting for what is known as an observation selection effect (Bostrom 2002b, Ćirković 4 et al. 2010). The basic idea is to build the existence of the observer into probability estimates for catastrophes that would eliminate future observers. The result is probability estimates unbiased by the observer’s existence, with global catastrophe probability estimates typically revised upwards. The third form of the mistake is to posit that, because humanity has survived previous catastrophes, or risks of catastrophes, therefore it will survive future ones. This mistake is especially pervasive in discussions of nuclear war. People sometimes observe that no nuclear war has ever occurred and cite this as evidence to conclude that therefore nuclear deterrence and the fear of mutually assured destruction will indefinitely continue to keep the world safe (for discussion see Sagan and Waltz 2013). But there have been several near misses, from the 1962 Cuban missile crisis to the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident, and there is no guarantee that nuclear war will be avoided into the distant future. Similarly, just because no pandemic has ever killed the majority of people (Black Death killed about 22%), or just because early predictions about the rise of artificial intelligence proved false (they expected human-level AI within decades that have long since come and gone; see Crevier 1993; McCorduck 2004), it does not necessarily follow that no pandemics would be so lethal, or that AI cannot reach the lofty heights of the early predictions. Careful risk analysis can correct for the third form by looking at the full sequences of events that would lead to particular global catastrophes. For example, nuclear weapons in the United States are launched following a sequence of decisions by increasingly high ranking officials, ultimately including the President. This decision sequence can be built into a risk model, with model parameters estimated from historical data on how often each step in the decision sequence has been reached (Barrett et al. 2013). The more often near misses have occurred, and the nearer the misses were, the higher the probability of an eventual “hit” in the form of a nuclear war. The same analytic structure can be applied to other GCRs.

#### Their card says economic decline causes an increase in white nationalism — turns their impact

Robert **Jervis 11**, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, **it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough** to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that **even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited**, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen **such a sharp economic down-turn** without **anyone** suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that **even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict**, **it will not make war thinkable**.